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Last December,  a pilot set out to fly a full-scale replica of a machine that had been 
flown a hundred years earlier.  The flight was planned as part of a centennial 
celebration of the first sustained human-piloted, powered, controlled flight.  The 
attempt, made last December 17th, took place at the same spot -- Kill Devil Hills, North 
Carolina -- where Orville Wright made a successful, historically significant flight with 
his flying machine, and exactly one hundred years to the minute after it.  The 
organization that built the replica had spent years building an exact replica of the 
structure and the engine, using exactly the same materials used in the original, even 
using period tools to build some of its parts.  
But the flight did not go as hoped. The replica of the flyer flown in December 1903 did 
not get off the ground on that day in 2003 when the re-enactment was attempted in 
front of the crowd of over 30,000 people who had come to witness it.  
CBS News reported the event with the clever headline:  “Wright Re-enactment Goes 
Wrong”.  This evaluation of the event as a failure, however, was only an evaluation of 
that particular event as a re-enactment of the event on December 17, 1903.   That is, 
put as a descriptive statement, it was simply stating the lack of similarity in 
performance between two particular situations: the one on December 17th 1903 and 
the one on December 17th 2003.  
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The organization sponsoring the event drew a different comparison than CBS News 
did:  
Our attempt at flight on December 17, 2003 replicated 
almost exactly the Wright brothers' first public attempt at 
flight, May 23, 1904. Lack of wind, engine trouble, and 
Wilbur got as far as the end of the rail...and went nowhere.
--- “The Flyer in Flight : 2003”  from website: The Wright 
Experience   1   
Thus, as a re-enactment of a different event  that took place on May 23, 1904,  they 
were saying, the event was actually a success!  What occurred on December 17, 2003 
at Kill Devil Hills, they were saying, was in fact similar to another particular event -- not 
the one exactly a hundred years previous to it, but to an event that occurred in 1904, in 
a field called Huffman Prarie in the state of Ohio. 
Their claim had some merit:  despite the painstaking attention to detail expended in 
constructing their model of the machine -- an exact, full-scale replica, in this case -- 
what we’re often most interested in, and what constitutes physical similarity, is similar 
performance.  That is, the goal is to have the phenomena of interest  associated with 
the thing being modelled arise in the model, too -- here, the phenomenon of interest is 
that the flying machine become airborne in a controlled, manned, sustained flight.  The 
replication of details such as the exact day of the year, time of day, and geographical 
location are not relevant to bringing about that phenomenon.  The atmospheric 
conditions are. 
There are other phenomenon associated with the original event in 1903 that are not 
captured by any possible re-enactment of it in 2003.  Nobody would claim that any re-
enactment of the 1903 event, no matter how successful, would carry with it the 
historical significance of the original event.  The original event was historically 
significant in that it proved that the problem of controlling sustained powered human-
piloted flying machines had finally been solved.  The later effects this achievement 
1
   The Wright Experience,  “The Wright Experience in Flight”  excerpted from online resource 
(http://www.wrightexperience.com/edu/12_17_03/html/121703.htm) on September 22, 2004.
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would have on society as a whole --- how, once the news spread to Europe,  money 
would be invested by nations as well as by private industrialists in airplanes and 
airplane manufacturing ventures, that there would be major changes in how fast mail 
could be delivered, in how warfare would be conducted,  and and so on --- are not 
associated with the re-enactment.   Yet, this is not because economic and social 
phenomena cannot be the basis of similarity between particular situations.  
In fact, judgements of similarity regarding the historical significance of the 1903 event 
have been made, just recently.  I am of course referring to the historical flights of the 
privately developed spacecraft SpaceShipOne, which has been referred to as the 
Wright Flyer of spacecraft .  The similarity to Orville Wright’s historic flight is being 
drawn on the basis of the historical significance of the event, rather than on the basis 
of similarity of the physics of the event.  SpaceShipOne won a competition with a 10 
million dollar prize, called the X-Prize, which required repeated, controlled space 
flights by a spacecraft whose design and execution was privately funded.  Several 
self-made entrepeneurs dedicated time and significant parts of their personal fortunes 
towards the design of a spacecraft built to win the prize, with the ultimate goal of a 
successful commercial venture of a new sort -- suborbital space travel.  
Those who call the spacecraft “the Wright Flyer of spacecraft” do so because they think 
it will change the nature of space travel in society.  Like the Wright Flyer, it was 
privately developed and cost a fraction of the sum spent by a government-funded 
program with the same goal.  Comparisons were made between the fact that the 
Wright Brothers constructed their own wind tunnel, and the fact that the 
SpaceShipOne inventor likewise improvised in lieu of using expensive government or 
university research facilities:  for example, by using the back of a pickup truck 
speeding in a straight line through the desert as a test rig for studying airflow over 
airfoils.  Like the Wright Flyer, SpaceShipOne will provide a flight experience hitherto 
unavailable that many are eager to pay for, at a price they can actually pay.  In drawing 
a comparison between Orville Wright’s historic flight in December of 1903 and the 
flights being flown in pursuit of the X-Prize in October 2004, the similarity between the 
particular event in 1903 and the particular event in 2004 is based on the economic 
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and societal significance of the event.  Such comparisons are relevant to answering 
questions about what kinds of resources and incentives are necessary conditions for 
certain kinds of technological achievements.
Now, as I’ve just stated it, what constitutes similarity is relative to a phenomenon -- the  
phenomenon of interest.  I just talked about three different similarity comparisons.  
First,  the static mechanical-structural similarity between the exact replica of the 
machine produced in 2003 and the original one produced in 1903.  Then, the dynamic 
similarity of the 2003 event and an event in 1904 -- occasions on which an exact 
replica of  the Wright Flyer and the original, respectively, performed similarly poorly.  
And, finally, there was the similarity between the 1903 event and SpaceShipOne’s 
successful flight this year (2004), based upon similarity of historical significance.   
Thus, similarity is itself defined in terms of interests.  If we are talking about human 
endeavors, these will be interests humans have.  That similarity turns out on this 
account to be relative to human interests is not an oversight on my part --- nor is it a 
drawback to the use of similarity.   It does not mean that similarity is subjective as 
opposed to objective, merely that similarity is relative to a phenomenon.  There is no 
such thing as absolute similarity;  similarity can only be similarity with respect to some 
feature or phenomenon of interest.   
The use of similarity in scientific inference is ubiquitious, although it is not always 
explicitly recognized.  For instance, observations of events in the laboratory are 
considered informative about other things and events that go beyond the specifics of 
the observed case.  In so doing, we are implicitly assuming there is a class of events or 
situations that are similar to the given event, and that the given event is informative of 
other events in that class.  This is true in general, whether the area is mechanics, 
acoustics, hydrodynamics, chemistry, or whatever.   A twofold question now arises:  (i)  
when an observation is made on a specific setup in a controlled laboratory setting or in 
a natural setting, what determines the class of other events to which it is deemed 
similar?  And (ii) what kind of correspondence is there between the observed event 
and these other events?  
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To take an especially striking example in the philosophical literature, consider 
experiments done using laboratory setups in hydrodynamics.  Margaret Morrison has 
discussed Ludwig Prandtl’s experimental investigations of fluid flow over a sphere 
using a water tank.  Let’s take a closer look at what is involved in the step she 
describes as follows:  “Although the existence of frictional forces were known, what the 
experiments indicated was that the flow about a solid body can be divided into two 
parts, the thin layer in the neighbourhood of the body where friction plays an essential 
role (the boundary layer) and the region outside this layer where it can be neglected.” 
(“Models as Autonomous Agents” in Models as Mediators, p. 55)   The question I want 
to ask about this is:  “What was the basis for making inferences about cases other than 
the specific case in the laboratory setup Prandtl used?”   That is,  what was the 
criterion for saying which other cases are like the one observed, and in what respect?  
What is our basis for being able to say which other objects and setups would behave 
like the one observed, were the experiment run on them?  Think of the disappointing 
re-enactment of the flight attempted with an exact replica of the airplane I opened my 
talk with.  It is not that the explanation there is a mystery to us; the point is that that 
example illustrates that distinctions need to be made in order to pick out the cases that 
will behave similarly from those that will not.  I understand that Michael Heidelberger is 
going to discuss Ludwig Prandtl’s work on the theory of the boundary layer in his talk, 
so I’ll try to restrict myself here to just this one aspect of Prandtl’s work.  
In general, if we want to play it absolutely safe in drawing inferences from an observed 
case, we would have to restrict our inference to cases using exactly the same fluid at 
exactly the same temperature and pressure, flowing at exactly the same velocity, in 
exactly the same geometrical configuration, at exactly the same scale.  We would also 
have to use exactly the same size and shape of object, made of exactly the same 
material with exactly the same surface finish.  Even after all that, we’d have to hope 
that no external time-varying factors such as sunspots made a difference to the 
phenomena we’d observe.  Of course this is unsatisfactory.  The observations are 
taken to have more generality, and they need to be, if we are to gain any practical 
knowledge.  But, on what basis is the generalization of the observation made? 
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The experimenter needs to have enough insight into what the phenomena depends 
upon to know how to characterize equivalent classes of situations, that is, situations 
that are equivalent with respect to giving rise to the phenomenon of interest.  Although 
some insights can be gained by varying individual variables such as velocity, density, 
viscosity, size, and so on one by one, ultimately what is needed, however it is 
obtained, is the ability to characterize situations and determine which situations are 
similar to each other with respect to the phenomenon of interest.  Without that crucial 
ability, all one has is an inventory of observations of individual cases.  
Thus, an experimenter needs to have some criterion for similarity, and, in fact, is 
employing similarity criteria whether or not he or she realizes it.  That’s my general 
point, and my point about Prandtl’s experiment in particular is that Prandtl did not start 
from scratch with respect to criteria for hydrodynamical similarity.  To carry out the kind 
of investigations he did, he needed to be able already to characterize the kind of 
situations he was going to investigate, and that means he used some criteria of 
hydrodynamical similarity, whether good or bad.  A researcher using incorrect 
similarity criteria is not going to get robust results from his or her investigations.  
Prandtl used appropriate similarity criteria, and he obtained spectacularly robust 
results.
Fortunately, Prandtl already had pretty good reasons for suspecting that one of  the 
nondimensional factors on which the phenomenon he was investigating would 
depend would be the nondimensional parameter now known as Reynolds number.   
The Reynolds number is a product involving fluid density, relative fluid velocity, a 
linear dimension, and viscosity, all in a single nondimensional parameter.  This had 
been the result of many years of work by Osborne Reynolds, beginning with his 
observation that temperature seemed to affect fluid flow phenomena, and in turn that 
viscosity varies with temperature.  From Reynolds’ work, too, Prandtl -- and all the 
world --- knew that the formation of patterns of vortices in viscous fluids was an 
important phenomenon to investigate and categorize.  And, again, the relevant 
criterion of similarity of situations -- i.e., the basis on which to identify equivalence 
classes of situations, was the Reynolds number.  
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Another clue about similarity that Prandtl had to work with came from William Froude’s 
work on towing ship hulls in water tanks.  Froude had shown that when a ship hull was 
moving with respect to a fluid,  there was a layer of water that formed near the ship 
hull, and Froude carrried out investigations specifically on the causes and effects of 
this “skin” phenomenon (which would later be called the boundary layer).   Froude’s 
case itself illustrates my general point. 
Several decades before Prandtl’s experiments, Froude used a water tank for the 
purpose of experimenting on scaled-down models of ship hulls being towed through 
water.  Now, the question is, what did experimental observations on that case tell him?  
The answer is found in the similarity these experimental setups have with other setups.  
Since similarity is relative to a phenomenon, the question only makes sense in the 
context of specifying a phenomenon of interest.  Using the similarity law of his day, he 
said that observations on his model told him the resistance of a ship hull of the same 
shape but of a size n times as large, travelling at that velocity times the square root of 
n,  if you scale the resistance up by n3.  This basis for similarity is similarity with 
respect to the effects of gravitational forces, and it only gave good results if viscosity 
was not important to the phenomenon of interest, the overall resistance the ship 
experienced in travelling through the water.  Froude did realize, though, that as you 
used smaller and smaller sized scale models, there were disproportionate effects that 
was probably due to the viscosity of the fluid.  Froude observed that viscous shear on 
the full size ship hull models created a layer of fluid that “stuck” against the hull, but 
further hypothesized that the fluid within this layer was in motion with respect to the 
ship hull. Once he began to suspect that in fact the phenomenon of interest, resistance 
to a ship travelling in the water, might depend not only on gravitational forces but also 
on viscous forces, he devised a method to account for it. [Rouse, History of Hydraulics, 
p. 185]  The details here are not important.  The point is that the observations on the 
laboratory model do not stand on their own -- in order to associate the observations 
made in one situation with any other situation, you need a basis on which to make 
similarity judgements.  
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Froude’s investigations led him to attribute this difference to the phenomenon now 
called the boundary layer, and in turn to attribute that phenomenon to fluid friction, or 
viscosity.  This was another clue about that a relevant criteria for similarity.  All this was 
the background knowledge about hydrodynamical similarity that preceded Prandtl’s 
work.  This background knowledge enabled him to properly characterize the fluid flow 
situations he was investigating.  My point is that this was crucial in two ways:  it was 
crucial to his  being able to achieve the experimental results he did in the first place, 
and it was crucial to the results he obtained being applicable to other situations.  
 
Let me bring out this same two-sided point with another example from history of 
science:  the principle of corresponding states, from chemistry and thermodynamics.  
This principle, due to van der Waals,  has appeared a few times in discussions by 
philosophers of science, including Glymour, Friedman and Morrison, but usually in the 
contexts of scientific realism or theory reduction.   The limitations of Boyle’s law (PV = 
RT)  were well-known in van der Waals’s day:  Boyle’s law applied only for low 
pressures and high temperatures, it didn’t apply to the liquid state, and it didn’t 
describe the transition between vapor and liquid states.  The popularity of steam 
engines led to a practical interest in vapor-liquid transitions, and to observations of  
rapidly increasing pressures of enclosed vapor at temperatures above the boiling 
point of water.  Experiments were also carried out on enclosed liquids and vapors of 
other substances, which led to cataloguing the critical temperatures of various liquids, 
and to liquefying gases at ambient temperatures by compressing them. [How Fluids 
Unmix, Chapter 2 ]  
What may have stimulated Van der Waals to develop his equation was Thomas 
Andrews’s work on the state of a substance at which vapor and liquid are identical, 
which Andrews called the “critical point”.  Andrews also investigated what happened 
when compressing vapor above the critical temperature, coining the term “continuity of 
states.”  [How Fluids Unmix,  p. 14 ]  Van der Waals added two parameters to Boyle’s 
Law, “a” and “b”, both constants meant to reflect characteristics of a specific substance.  
The two parameters were to account for the factors of the volume the molecules 
occupy and the mutually attractive forces between them.  So, what van der Waals did 
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here was to use some partial knowledge about the model he suspected was 
responsible for the phenomenon being described.   
The Van der Waals equation was far more than a detailed version of Boyle’s law -- 
unlike Boyle’s law, it explained fluid criticality and continuity of states, and it 
qualitatively described empirical results of new investigations being carried out.   But 
the most significant conceptual step was the principle of corresponding states.  The 
principle of corresponding states arises out of applying the van der Waals equation to 
find the critical points of a given substance in terms of the parameters a and b, and 
then, essentially, using the values of critical pressure, critical volume, and critical 
temperature of the substance as a unit of measure.  The pressure expressed as a ratio 
of pressure to critical pressure is called a “reduced pressure”, and reduced 
temperature and reduced volume are similarly defined.  If we retain the expressions for 
the critical values in terms of a and b, and express pressure, temperature, and volume  
in these units of measure, we obtain a form of the van der Waals equation in which the 
postulated constants a and b no longer appear.  The resulting equation is then in 
terms of reduced temperature, reduced pressure, and reduced volume.  Since it does 
not contain the substance-specific constants a and b,  it  applies to all substances.  The 
principle was thus an improvement over the van der Waals equation, as knowledge of 
the critical values of a substance obviated the need to determine the substance-
specific parameters a and b.  Van der Waals did come to recognize that even the 
principle of corresponding states was only approximate.  Yet,  as one textbook puts it:  
“This is a truly remarkable result.”  pointing out that the equation expressing the 
principle of corresponding states  “is universal:  all characteristics of individual fluids 
have disappeared from it or, rather, have been hidden in the reduction factors.” [How 
Fluids Unmix, p. 25]  
 What I want to emphasize about the principle of corresponding states here is that we 
can think of it as providing a similarity criterion.  It puts into one equivalence class the 
states of all substances that are at the same reduced pressure, temperature, and 
volume.  This aspect of the principle provoked another scientist, Heike Kamerlingh 
Onnes, to look for its basis in another, known similarity principle.  In his Nobel lecture, 
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Onnes said  that the law of corresponding states “had a particular attraction for me 
because I thought to find the basis for it in the stationary mechanical similarity of 
substances and from this point of view the study of deviations in substances of simple 
chemical structure with low critical temperatures seemed particularly important.”   He 
won the Nobel prize in 1913  for his success in applying these ideas to the problem of 
liquefying helium.       
As with most similarity principles, there are two complementary faces to the law of 
corresponding states:  on the one hand it supplies criteria for characterizing situations, 
and on the other it provides a means of translating the specific features of one situation 
into the corresponding specific features of another.  As for the first aspect of the 
principle -- characterizing situations -- the characterization of a state is in terms of 
reduced pressure, temperature, and volume and is independent of the substance.  As 
for the second aspect, it is easy to see how the translation between situations works 
here:  take, for example, pressure.  Suppose you conclude you have a substance in a 
certain state; then you know the reduced pressure.   The pressure for a particular 
substance in that state can be found by multiplying the reduced pressure by the critical 
pressure of that substance.  [How Fluids Unmix, p. 25]
I have been emphasizing the importance of such similarity principles as background 
knowledge necessary for carrying out investigations, even laboratory investigations.  
Let me close this talk by saying a little about the source of such similarity principles.
In both hydrodynamical similarity and the law of corresponding states,  the similarity 
principle is a consequence of an equation deemed applicable to the phenomenon 
being investigated: hydrodynamic similarity is a consequence of a fluid flow equation, 
and the law of corresponding states is a consequence of the van der Waals equation.  
In general, if you’ve got a governing equation describing a phenomenon in hand, a 
similarity principle can be obtained straightforwardly by manipulating the equation into 
a form such that the requisite nondimensional parameters are obtained by inspection 
of the equation.  However,  you don’t need a governing equation in order to obtain a 
similarity principle; you can get by with much less.  
Sterrett/  Models of Machines PSA 2004 “ Applying Science”  -- p.  10  .
                   
10
Both hydrodynamical similarity and the law of corresponding states can be derived 
from merely the knowledge of the list of quantities upon which the phenomenon 
depends.  That means that you need only know the form of the equation in the most 
general sense, i.e.,  that the phenomenon is a function of quantity 1, quantity 2, etc.  As 
long as the list is complete, and doesn’t contain extraneous quantities, the method of 
dimensional analysis will show a valid similarity principle valid; i.e., that the Reynolds 
number is indeed a basis for hydrodynamical similarity, and that the law of 
corresponding states is indeed a basis for thermodynamical similarity.  Further, even if 
you don’t have a candidate similarity principle to verify, the method will also always 
yield results, in the form of  one or more nondimensional  parameters that will provide 
a basis for similarity.  It will not yield an equation describing the phenomenon, but no 
such equation is needed in order to establish similarity.  There is one drawback to the 
method;  since it is based upon a purely logical analysis of the dimensions of the 
quantities involved, the parameters produced by the method might not have physical 
significance.  So, the complaint is often made that method is not of much practical use. 
There is a third approach that tries to make use of all the information and physical 
insight one might have at hand.  I am taking the notion, called “configurational 
analysis”,  from a field of research called fire modelling, but it is applicable to any field.  
Now, fires are not tidy things -- all kinds of factors matter, such as the configuration of 
the space where the fire occurs, how the configuration is changed by the fire 
devouring parts of a building, the kinds of materials and atmospheric conditions it 
encounters as it progresses,  and so on.  The phenomena to be  modelled have 
probably not even been exhaustively catalogued.  All kinds of pure science are 
brought to bear on the problem, although this is not a situation where we reasonably 
expect to obtain equations that describe the resulting phenomena.  We may use our 
speculations or knowledge about physical mechanisms or fundamental principles to 
pick out important factors that affect the phenomenon of interest.  What we use this 
information for, however, is not to solve equations.  Rather, the goal is to figure out 
similarity conditions.  We then use the similarity conditions to build models and, after 
using the model experimentally,  to infer corresponding particular features of the 
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situations they are meant to model.  Alternatively, we can use observational data in 
lieu of experimental data; then, the similarity criteria help in categorizing and making 
inferences from cases at hand. 
Now, as I said, one drawback of dimensional analysis was that the nondimensional 
parameters the process produces are not guaranteed to have any physical 
significance, and in order to experiment with a model, we need to have parameters to 
vary that have some physical significance.  What  the configurational analysis 
approach involves is first using physical insight in conjunction with the logical principle 
of dimensional homogeneity.  In the words of the author of a paper entitled “Fire 
Modeling” from which the notion of “configurational analysis” comes, the method 
“permits the welding of similitude theory and a ‘feeling’ for the problem at hand”.  The 
guiding idea for employing a ‘feeling’ for the problem is explained as follows:  
Consider a device or process subject to change in space or time.  
Quantitative statements about the system will be statements about 
force, matter, or energy.  A statement of the existence of a balance 
of forces, for example, will of necessity contain terms which are 
dimensionally identical, and division through by one of the terms 
will produce a set of force ratios.  These ratios must be the same in 
similar systems. Similar statements may be made about 
conservation of matter and energy. (Hottel, “Fire Modeling”, p. 32) 2 
Thus, very general principles such as conservation laws are employed to guide the 
selection of nondimensional parameters on which a similarity principle for the 
phenomenon of interest can be obtained.  As the author has stated things, the starting 
point is to identify the “device or process” , but I think it clear that this includes 
identifying the phenomena associated with the device or the process that we are 
interested in, and any that might be causally important to it.  This is where background 
2
   Hottel, H. C. “Fire Modeling” in  The Use of Models in Fire Research,  Publication 786, National Academy 
of Sciences, National Research Council,  Washington, D. C., 1961.   I am totally indebted to the work of 
Becker on scale modelling in chemical engineering research for drawing attention to Hottel’s paper, in 
which he explains the notion of what Becker calls “configurational analysis”.  
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knowledge such as that small viscosities can be important, or that the mutual attraction 
between the molecules of an enclosed gas can be important, is brought into the 
development of the similarity conditions.   
The author mentions ratios of forces, masses, and energy, but it is not hard to see that 
the same approach could be taken for problems of other sorts as well.   The key parts 
of this approach are to identify sources, fluxes, and boundaries, and then apply 
insights about continuity and conservation to them. Economists are used to drawing 
analogies between fluid flows and flows of currency.   Even Freud used hydraulic and 
thermodynamic analogies.  It is easy to see that the general point about using flow 
balances  could be employed whenever a process or device is conceived in terms of 
fluxes of any sort --  flows of information, birth and death rates, flows of capital 
investment,  flows of goods and natural resources, of technological expertise,  flows of 
nerve energies, flows of inhibitory signals, and so on.
My point at the beginning of the paper was that similarity between particular situations 
was based upon similarity with respect to a phenomenon of interest.  When the 
equations describing a phenomenon are already in hand, there is more than enough 
information to establish similarity criteria.  However, similarity criteria can be 
established with less information as well.  There are methods that produce similarity 
criteria that do not require specifying the device or process, but the similarity criteria 
they produce may not be in a meaningful or useful form.  Now we see how a rather 
abstract characterization of a device or process -- a model of the device or process, we 
might well call it -- is employed in obtaining similarity criteria of practical significance 
that can be useful in designing experiments or collecting observational data.   
Summarizing these reflections, there are several ways that models can be involved in 
applying science: 
-- Anytime observations are used to make generalizations or inferences beyond 
an  observed case, one event is being used as a model of another event, or of 
an equivalence class of other events.  These comparisons are based upon 
Sterrett/  Models of Machines PSA 2004 “ Applying Science”  -- p.  13  .
                   
13
similarity criteria, and are relative to a phenomenon or phenomena of interest.   
Even characterizing experiments and observations involves employing 
similarity criteria, whether the person doing so realizes it or not.  Hence this use 
of a model -- using one event as a model of another, which is a model in the 
sense of modelling phenomena -- is ubiquitious in all sorts of scientific activities. 
-- If  the similarity criteria is obtained from an equation describing the 
phenomena,  a model in the more traditional sense of providing a mechanism 
may be involved inasmuch as a model of the device or process is often used in 
deriving the equation.  (However, having such an equation is not necessary; 
similarity criteria can be obtained even when an equation describing the 
phenomena of interest is not known.)
-- In order to obtain physically meaningful and practically useful similarity criteria 
without the use of a governing equation,  a characterization of the device or 
process in terms of equilibrium or steady-state flow fluxes, sources, and 
boundaries is valuable in conjunction with the formal method of dimensional 
analysis.  Balances and conservation principles can be applied to guide the 
construction of the nondimensional parameters used as similarity criteria.  
Thus, models of machines and mechanisms can be (and generally are) involved in 
establishing criteria for similar phenomena,  which provide guidance in using events to 
model other events.  Conversely,  models of phenomena such as events that model 
other events can be (and generally are) involved in experimentation on models of 
machines.
We see that often it is not more detailed models or the more precise equations they 
engender that leads to better understanding.  Often, what is most helpful is an 
insightful use of knowledge at hand to determine which similarity principles are most 
appropriate in allowing us to infer what we do not know from what we are able to 
observe.  I hope my discussion here today has helped in getting more precise about 
that insight.     
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